The Armenia Social Investment Fund supports communities' efforts to improve local infrastructure during Armenia's economic transition away from central planning. In Armenia the social fund encourages communities to organize projects that rehabilitate primary schools and water facilities, financing approximately 90 percent of initiatives that communities design and implement. This study considers the targeting, household impact and community effects of Armenia's social fund activities. It relies upon a nationally representative household survey, over-sampled in areas where the social fund was active. Using propensity and pipeline match techniques to control for community selfselection into the social fund, it evaluates household impacts of rehabilitating schools and health posts. The social fund reached poor households, particularly in rural areas. Compared with control groups, education projects increased households' education expenditures to a significant degree and had mild effects on school attendance. Potable water projects improved household access to water and improved health. Those communities that completed a social fund project were less likely than the control group to complete other local infrastructure projects, suggesting social capital was expended in these early projects. By contrast, communities that joined ASIF later and had not yet completed their projects took more initiatives not supported by the social fund.
Introduction
In centrally-planned economies, national governments exerted tremendous economic control. This control extended to local infrastructure investment, including building and maintenance of schools, water systems, and roads. When these economies collapsed, governments became bereft of resources. Systems maintaining local infrastructure operated only failingly. Concurrent with deep economic recession, schools and water systems fell into disrepair. Compounding other hardships, people living in post-Communist conditions suffered deteriorating local public services. However, because they were accustomed to central authorities meeting their local needs, communities often were unable to address their problems.
The World Bank supported social funds in post-Communist transition economies as part of a strategy to improve this situation. These flexible financing instruments provide resources for community initiatives to improve local infrastructure. Having operated in Latin America and Africa for several years, social funds in the former eastern block countries sought to provide temporary employment, alleviate local public service hardships, and catalyze communities to address their own local needs. This research investigates the household impact of one such project, the Armenia Social Investment Fund. It seeks to ascertain whether ASIF resources reached poorer households, whether the social fund altered the behavior or welfare of those in ASIF communities, and how the fund related to communities' ability to act collectively.
Since their introduction in Latin America at the end of the 1980s, there have been many investigations of social funds (see, for example, Marc et. al. 1993 , Khadiagala, 1995 , and Goodman et. al. 1997 . These adopted many different evaluative approaches, including analyses of fund disbursement patterns, institutional studies of operating procedures, and sociological studies of beneficiaries' attitudes. However, as of the mid-1990s, household data and quantitative techniques had been used for evaluation only for the Bolivia social fund. To provide deeper, more diverse evidence of social fund impact, in 1997 the World Bank initiated a multi-country analysis of social funds, Social Funds 2000. This Armenia study is part of that broader research program. Social Funds 2000 used household survey data to isolate statistically significant social fund effects in Armenia, Bolivia (Newman, et. al., 2000) , Honduras (Walker, 2000) , Nicaragua (Pradhan and Rawlings, 1999) , Peru (Schady and Paxson, 1999) and Zambia (Chase and Sherburne-Benz, 2001 ). This paper on Armenia is the first quantitative impact evaluation to consider a social fund in a post-Communist economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the objectives and operations of the Armenia social fund. The third summarizes data sources and research methodology.
Section four presents findings of the Armenia social fund's targeting. The next summarizes the social fund's effect on households. Section six gives evidence about the degree to which participating communities had more abundant social capital. The final section concludes.
The Armenia Social Investment Fund
Though social funds share common characteristics, each is designed to fit the particular objectives and institutions of the country operating it. The Armenian Social Investment Fund (ASIF) began as a USAID-funded pilot project to provide employment, support community initiatives, and enhance civil society during post-Communist transition. In January 1996 the first World Bank loan for ASIF became effective, providing $12 million of IDA financing for a $20 million project. While some of this funding helped develop institutions necessary to administer the social fund and monitor the evolution of Armenian household welfare, the majority provided resources to micro-projects that communities designed and implemented.
Between 1996 and December 2000 when the first ASIF loan closed, the social fund received 726 micro-project proposals, of which 334 were approved and 259 completed. While the average project size in the first years of operation was approximately $30,000, during its final years the cost increased to $75,000. Over the course of the loan the average project size was $50,000. As a direct result of ASIF I, 178 contractors implemented projects, offering jobs to 5000 people. According to the World Bank's Implementation Completion Review, the infrastructure changes reached an estimated 640,000 beneficiaries.
Like other social funds, ASIF offers a menu of micro-projects from which communities choose. It specified project types that would met the country's pressing local infrastructure needs and would likely only be interesting to communit ies in difficult circumstances, thus self-targeting ASIF resources to the poor. Of the 259 completed projects, 35 percent were small-scale school rehabilitations, 32 percent potable water projects, 11 percent minor irrigation works, and 5 percent health facilities. The remaining 17 percent included various initiatives in community centers, pension homes, sewage and waste, roads and landscaping. Given this distribution of micro-projects, this study focused on the impact of project types that made up the vast majority, i.e., school rehabilitations and water projects. In addition to their number, these two groups consist of projects that are relatively more homogenous, allowing easier comparisons within project types.
While communities stepped forward to participate in Armenia's social fund, the ASIF administration also targeted resources to areas of the country with the most pressing need for small-scale infrastructure improvements. It did not spread resources randomly across the country.
Thirty-eight percent of projects took place in marzes (regions) where the 1988 earthquake caused the most devastation -Lori, Shirak, and Aragosotn. Marzes that suffered most from the Karabakh conflict -Tavush and Sunik, implemented 21 percent of the projects. Yerevan also received 21 percent. And 15 percent were spread among the remaining five marzes. As discussed below, while this regional project distribution focused resources to marzes in the most difficult circumstances, it created technical challenges for the evaluation. Notably, by directing resources to specific areas, it became difficult to identify control communities that did not participate in the ASIF project but otherwise had similar characteristics to participating communities.
Data and Methodology
To analyze changes in household behavior and outcomes, the paper relies primarily on an integrated household survey. This comprehensive, nationally representative data source allows in-depth analysis of welfare of the Armenian population. Among other topics, the core survey instrument includes information about household composition, income, expenditures, education and health. Conducted from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999, its basic sample encompasses roughly 3600 households. Enumerators visited 20 households per sample cluster.
For impact evaluation, ASIF staff and the State Directorate of Statistics added a module to the integrated household survey instrument. This module posed questions related to ASIF activities and to community organizations and initiatives. It asked households to report changes to community infrastructure that had taken place in the previous five years. Further, households reported whether they took part in the effort to repair or upgrade that infrastructure and their attitudes towards resulting infrastructure.
To ensure adequate coverage of ASIF treatment areas, the survey over-sampled households where the social fund was active. Beyond the base sample representative of the Armenian population, survey enumerators visited an additional 2260 households living in 113 clusters where the social fund was active. Within this group of oversampled communities where the ASIF was active, the survey collected data about two groups of households: those where projects had been completed and those where ASIF had approved but not yet completed a project.
As the evaluation literature has long emphasized (for an overview, see Moffitt, 1991) , it is difficult to isolate the effects of an intervention, particularly when potential participants choose to involve themselves in a project. Fundamentally, impact evaluation compares outcome indicators between a group that completed the project, designated the treatment group, and a control group. With the correct control group, the difference between treatment and control isolates the effect of the intervention. However, in many cases, including that of social funds appropriate control groups can be hard to identify.
Given how social funds operate, for communities to participate in the intervention and join the treatment group, they must organize themselves to earn funding for their initiatives.
Before the social fund intervention has disbursed any resources, a treatment community distinguishes itself from its neighbors by assembling a project committee and proposal. A simple "with and without" comparison for social fund participants and non-participants is biased. It mistakenly attributes to the social fund itself community selection effects that encourage ASIF participation.
Randomized control design avoids these selection problems to create an appropriate control group by randomly selecting parts of the country where the social fund can and cannot operate. However, as with most other social funds (the Bolivia social fund being the one exception to date), the Armenia Social Investment Fund did not randomly choose where it could operate to allow this robust evaluative approach. However, alternative techniques allow the impact evaluation to generate treatment and control groups for ASIF.
Having collected information about households in communities where ASIF had approved, but not yet completed a project, we establish a pipeline comparison group. These communities have demonstrated they can organize themselves for social fund projects, so they do not suffer from selection bias. However, they have not yet gained the benefits of the completed ASIF project. Abstracting away from characteristics that led the community to participate in ASIF in the first place, we gain insight into the effects of those projects by comparing completed and pipeline communities.
In addition to pipeline matching, this study also uses propensity score community matching 1 to correct for selection biases. To create a control group, we analyze the traits of communities that participated in ASIF. We generate a propensity function which links community characteristics to the likelihood that it will submit a successful social fund subproject.
In Armenia, geography was a crucial determinant of which communities participated in the social fund. ASIF focused resources on the earthquake and conflict zones. Communities in these areas were more likely to participate in ASIF, and the basis for their inclusion in the program would differ than other areas. As a result, we estimated three separate propensity functions, stratifying the sample by the earthquake zone, the conflict zone, and other non-targeted areas. The propensity functions isolated how community means for expenditures, share spent on food, female headship and education leve ls operated in each of these zones.
The appendix presents estimates of propensity function parameters for each of the subsamples. We use these to predict the probability of program participation for all community clusters, pooling both those that did and did not participate. These probabilities are propensity scores.
To create a control group with the comparable propensity to participate in the social fund as treatment communities, in each zone we seek to match communities by propensity scores.
Each community that completed an ASIF project is paired with a community that did not but had an equivalent propensity score. Through this procedure, the control group consists of communities just as likely to participate in the social fund as the treatment group, though they did not actually participate. The difference between treatment and control isolates the effect of implementing the social fund sub-project, abstracting away from the selective community traits that led the community to work with the socia l fund in the first place.
While the idea of the propensity score match procedure is clear, its application in Armenia was challenging. Notably, for treatment communities with very high propensity scores, it was not always possible to find a control community equally likely to participate in the project. For many of the communities that did ASIF projects, estimated propensity scores were very close to one, signifying the community was almost sure to participate. To match against participating communities in these zones, there were no communities that almost assuredly should have participated but did not. A control group created from each of these zone-specific propensity matches does not adequately correct for selection bias.
Effectiveness of ASIF Targeting
Social funds support project options that only less well-off communities find attractive.
Further, by administrative efforts they target poorer areas. Through a combination of these two strategies, social funds purport to focus resources on a country's poorer communities. Household expenditure data from communities where the ASIF was active and from randomly selected communities give insights into whether the Armenia social fund met its targeting goals.
2 Table I Compared to other social fund studies, these findings are notable and somewhat surprising. Studies for other countries generally found rural social fund spending to be more progressive, and urban spending generally more regressive (see Chase and Sherburne-Benz, 2001 , Pradhan and Rawlings, 1999 , Newman, et. al., 2000 . ASIF targeted areas of poor infrastructure, such as the conflict and earthquake zones, where school and water rehabilitations could have a large direct effect. However, it did not explicitly target areas of low household expenditure. In Armenia, where an earthquake and conflict destroyed public facilities, poor infrastructure does not correspond to areas of smallest expenditure.
Regressive rural targeting may result from the 10 percent contribution that ASIF requires of communities. According to ASIF staff, in rural areas this contribution requirement selects against the poorest communities. Households there are unwilling or unable to contribute for community public goods such as schools or improved water systems.
Though relatively progressive urban targeting is also unusual for social funds, ASIF focused its activity on the capital city. Yerevan is one of the least well-off areas of the country, and ASIF activities reached its poorest communities. With many ASIF projects in Yerevan, progressive targeting there implies ASIF reached Armenia's relatively poorest households.
Project Education and Water Impact
If ASIF interventions affected households, we would observe impact through statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups. For this impact evaluation, we define treatment households as those situated within the sampling cluster where the ASIF completed renovations of a primary school or water facility. As described in section 3 above, this impact evaluation uses two types of control groups. The pipeline control group consists of households in communities that, at the time of the survey, had an ASIF project approved but had not yet started it. The propensity matched control group consists of households in communities matched according to the propensity score procedure. Across the country as a whole, ASIF generated few significant differences in how much households with primary school aged children spent on schools. However, in earthquake areas households in ASIF areas spent 22 percent more than those in the matched control group and 27 percent more than those in the pipeline group. The opposite appears to be the case in conflict zones, where ASIF households spent significantly less than either of the control groups: the expenditures of the treatment group averaged 2125 drams versus 4146 drams in the matched group and 3600 drams in the pipeline group. These findings point to different social fund effects in earthquake and conflict zones.
There is also evidence that school enrollments were higher in areas where ASIF supported school rehabilitation. In treatment areas, 87 percent of primary school age children were in school. This is significantly higher than the 79 percent in school in areas where an ASIF project had been approved but not yet started.
In earthquake zones, near ASIF-supported school rehabilitations households spent more on school and were more likely to have their children attend. Together, these pieces of evidence suggest that ASIF increased demand for education. If the quality of school facilities in the earthquake zones were low, renovations that ASIF financed would make the schools more attractive, increasing demand for primary education.
Subjective measures of changes in the quality of school services provide interesting insight into ASIF impact. Eight percent of households in ASIF areas responded that school services had improved in the past 12 months. In matched control households, fewer households (6 percent) said schools had recently improved, which suggests that people in ASIF communities have more positive impressions of their schools. However, in pipeline control communities, 12 percent reported improvements, which is significantly more than in the treatment communities.
This inconsistency could be explained because ASIF could have completed school changes some time ago, so that impressions of improvement are remote, while in pipeline match communities, there has been some recent discussion of school improvements. Regardless of whether there are significant increases or decreases, absolutely few households feel that schools in Armenia are improving.
Beyond school rehabilitations ASIF supported community water supply projects. The household data available allows analysis of the impact of ASIF potable water projects. Table III presents these findings, again comparing whether mean values differed significantly between households in ASIF communities and those in matched or pipeline communities.
ASIF water projects sought to improve local water supply. Thus, the primary variables of interest show household access to water and sanitation. Household data offers evidence that the projects improved access. For example, in ASIF treatment communities, 93 percent of households had access to cold running water. In matched and pipeline communities, 85 and 72 percent did, respectively. Further, 92 percent of households in ASIF areas had centralized water systems, which is significantly more than in both matched (83 percent) and pipeline (68 percent) communities. Finally, compared to pipeline control communities, more households had an indoor tap in ASIF areas. On several dimensions, households in ASIF communities had greater access to water facilities. The data also show these increases in earthquake and conflict zones of Armenia.
Subjective measures of changes in water service indicate that households in ASIF areas were more likely to report improvements in the previous 12 months than either of the comparison groups. Within the treatment group 34 percent said that water service had improved, as opposed to 22 percent in the matched control group and 28 percent in the pipeline control group. However, ASIF communities were no more likely to report improvements in sanitation. 
Community Participation Findings
Social fund support to local initiatives is often described as having important community impacts that may not appear in changed welfare of individual households. Importantly, ASIF beneficiary assessments accentuate how community participation in the social fund can change community attitudes, encouraging people to solve local problems through their own efforts. In post-Soviet societies where many look reflexively to central governments to resolve local problems, a program demonstrating that the community can act collectively might impact that institution positively. Further, as the literature on social capital suggests (see, for example, Grootaert, 2002) , communities that act collectively may be better endowed with positive structural or cognitive social capital. Household data offers some useful evidence of the relationship between ASIF activity and social capital.
Tables IV and V presents analysis about the relationships between ASIF activities and social capital in communities. While there is extensive debate about how to define and measure social capital (see, for example, Grootaert, 1997 , Knack and Keefer, 1997 and Woolcock, 1998 , the indicator used here focuses on collective action. Using the same treatment and control groups referred to throughout the study, percent are aware of it. This could result from ASIF rehabilitations taking place some time in the past, so that households were not aware of them or did not think of the changes as recent.
Table IV provides evidence that the community effort required to complete an ASIF school rehabilitation displaces other local infrastructure projects. To a statistically significant degree, communities that rehabilitated a school are less likely to have also built or rehabilitated a road or piped water system or rehabilitate a health facility. Further, communities in the ASIF pipeline were also more likely to have done other types of infrastructure projects than those that had completed an ASIF education project. Though not reported in Table V , communities in the ASIF education-project pipeline were more likel y than propensity matched communities to take other initiatives. This suggests that those communities participating later in ASIF had higher social capital.
Where ASIF water projects were completed, collective action does not appear to be as uniformly deflated as it does with education projects. Table V shows that completing an ASIF project reduced the likelihood that communities would build or rehabilitate a new school, health facility, road or reservoir. However, it increased the likelihood that the community would rehabilitate a health facility or build a new road. Like with education projects, communities who
had not yet completed their ASIF-supported water initiatives were more likely to have done other infrastructure projects, such as build or rehabilitate a school.
In general, if we use as an indicator of social capital whether the community undertook other community initiatives, those communities that completed ASIF projects had lower social capital than propensity score matched comparators. However, those ASIF communities that had not yet completed their projects, i.e., those that participated in the social fund after it had been in place for some time, had significantly higher social capital.
Conclusion
This research offers several insights into how the Armenia social fund impacted households during post-Communist transition. It provides evidence about the degree to which the ASIF reached poor Armenian households, the effects of those changed facilities on households within the projects' catchment area, and the effects on community collective action.
ASIF was not specifically designed to reach relatively poorer communities. Instead, it sought to reach areas of poor infrastructure, where primary schools and water systems were in particular disrepair. Nonetheless, by some robust measures, ASIF resources reached relatively less-well-off parts of the population. Across Armenia, the average ASIF household is less well off than the average Armenian household. Further, when isolating both urban and rural areas, the same is true. However, using concentration curves to consider the entire distribution of expenditures, the story is not as clear. In general, with regard to poverty targeting, ASIF resources were relatively neutral. They were slightly progressive in urban areas and slightly regressive in rural areas. One explanation for progressive urban targeting is a focus on Yerevan, whose population suffered acutely from economic dislocation. Regressive rural targeting may result from difficult ies rural communities faced meeting 10 percent community contributions, so that relatively poorer communities were excluded.
Using propensity score and pipeline matching of household data, this analysis demonstrated several impacts of education and water rehabilitations. In the earthquake zone, household primary education expenditures and primary school attendance both increased, suggesting increased demand for education services. ASIF potable water interventions improved household access to water, and households in ASIF areas reported improvements in water services. However, there were few robust indicators that households were healthier where the social fund helped rehabilitate the water system.
One of the central objectives of the Armenian Social Investment Fund was to increase community involvement. Those communities that completed a social fund project were less likely than control groups to complete other local infrastructure projects, suggesting social capital was expended in these early projects. By contrast, communities that joined ASIF later and had not yet completed their projects reported more community collective action.
For a social fund operating in a transition economy, this analysis provides useful evidence about targeting, household impacts, and community social capital. While further research is needed to improve upon evaluative approaches, it provides substantial evidence from
Armenia that these instruments reach communities in difficult economic circumstances. Further, social funds affect facilities available to households. Finally, at least in the communities that recently involved themselves, the social fund either attracts more active communities or bolsters communities' ability to address their own local needs. Given these effects, social funds appear to be a useful tool to improve public services in Armenia. As they operate to an increasing degree in an increasing number of countries undergoing transition from central planning, we will have more opportunities to learn whether it is appropriate to generalize from the Armenia evidence analyzed here to broader social fund efforts to support transition. (4) 15.0 ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
